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Introduction
In a previous analysis of Chinese-language newspapers and journals and Chi-
nese organizations in Malaya (present-day Malaysia and Singapore) from the
end of World War II until around 1960, I discussed the rise among the Chi-
nese in Malaya of a China-oriented identity consciousness (i.e., viewing China
as one’s homeland, having a stronger interest in developments happening in
China than in Malayan affairs, and getting involved in Chinese internal poli-
tics), its eventual decline, and the appearance of a deep-rooted Malayan iden-
tity in its place.1 However, the analysis only dealt with the editorial opinions
of Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-related periodicals and the size and ac-
tivities of the major Chinese organizations, such as the Malayan branch of the
China Democratic League (CDL; Zhongguo Minzu Tongmeng).
However, that earlier study did not examine how the China-oriented iden-
tity of the whole Chinese community in Malaya was reflected in their politi-
cal and social activity, what kind of organizations participated in such activ-
ity, and when and how such organizations began to foster (or be converted to)
a Malaya-oriented identity, or when and how they disappeared (or were com-
pelled to disband) before Malayanization could occur.
The earlier study also did not discuss important elements for measuring the
level of China-oriented identity, such as the policy that the Chinese govern-
ment (including the Chinese consulates in Malaya) implemented at the local
level, the influence that this policy exerted on Malayan Chinese, and the per-
ception that the Chinese community in Malaya had of the Chinese govern-
ment and its consulates.
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I would like to take up these yet untouched questions in the present vol-
ume, looking at the conditions under which the Chinese community nurtured
its Malaya-oriented identity and at the kind of movements this phenomenon
was linked to. For in order to gain a total picture of the evolution of identity
consciousness and analyze its meaning, it is necessary to investigate not only
the depth of China-oriented identity, but also the process by which a Malaya-
oriented identity came into existence.
I.
Much of the research to date has focussed on the connection between social
movements among Malayan Chinese and their Chinese homeland prior to the
outbreak of World War II, especially from 1937 when the Sino-Japanese War
broke out and they lent support to China’s struggle against the Japanese. How-
ever, concerning the postwar period, when connections with China continued
to run deep and were even strengthened in part, there has been almost nothing
written about the relation between China and the Malayan Chinese commu-
nity or the changes that were taking place in those relations. This is because
the main current in the study of overseas Chinese shifted toward the analysis
of their economic power and their contributions to national independence in
their countries of residence, and any connections to China were for the most
part ignored, thus creating a gap between the content of the prewar and post-
war research.
In Wang Gungwu’s “Chinese Politics in Malaya,” still the best piece of
basic analysis on the political history of the Malayan Chinese, the commu-
nity is divided into three groups according to their levels of “commitment to
politics in China,” a typology that remains the most widely accepted approach
to the subject. Wang describes his categories in the following manner.
Group A which maintains links with the politics of China . . . and is concerned
always to identify with the destiny of China. . . . Group B which consists of the
hard-headed and realistic majority of the Chinese who are more concerned with
the low-posture and indirect politics of trade and community associations. . . .
[They] rarely express themselves on questions of political ideals and long-term
political goals. . . . Group C, it is . . . generally committed to some sort of Ma-
layan [now Malaysian] loyalty.2
Wang sums up the characteristic features of the period from the end of the
war to Malayan independence as follows.
The Chinese in Malaya . . . [were] jubilant at the Allied victory and by the emer-
gence of China as one of the Great Powers. . . . Group B . . . looked forward to
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benefits which a strong China might, perhaps only indirectly, bring to them, and
Group A resumed their enthusiastic involvement in China’s politics, some return-
ing to China in the hope of joining its reconstruction on the ground floor.
. . . a new element had entered their calculations—the power and organizational
skill of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) with their mainly Group A Chinese
leadership. . . .
. . . we should examine the reconstitution of the three groups. . . . First, Group A
and its immediate division into those who favored Kuomintang (KMT) national-
ists or some of the ineffective anti-KMT liberal democrats and those who threw in
their lot with Communists and actively supported what they saw as their Malayan
counterpart, the MCP. . . . The divisions had no real local context and the issues
were mainly those related to the reunification of China. . . . The MCP leaders,
which included Group C Chinese recruited into the movement during the war, did
make an effort to define their political goals in local and Malayan national terms,
but within the community as a whole this was not seen as its central aim and most
Chinese either supported or rejected the MCP because of its relationship with the
larger aims of Chinese communism. [3] (italics added)
Wang had an accurate understanding of the postwar issues and discussed them
objectively and incisively, showing that Malayan Chinese interest in China
peaked just after the war and pointing out that leaders of the Malayan Com-
munist Party (MCP) whose utmost objective was to liberate Malaya con-
sisted mainly of China-oriented members. However, as indicated by his analy-
sis and methodology, Wang’s aim was to present an overview of the political
consciousness and activities of the Malayan Chinese since the end of the nine-
teenth century, and not to give a detailed period-by-period description of the
evolution of such consciousness and activities. Therefore, he did not delve
specifically into the kinds of movements that were created in Malaya during
the postwar peak of interest in China, how these affected the movements of
MCP-based Group A Chinese, or how they evolved. Such analysis had to
await future research. Unfortunately these questions were not taken up with
the interest they deserve.
The research that has been done to date can be summarized as follows.
Within the enormous amount of literature that has been published on the
postwar political consciousness and activities of the Malayan Chinese, there
are very few works expressing the opinion that they were not interested al all
in what was happening in China. The only research that this author is aware
of in this vein is the book by Edgar O’Ballance in which he describes “a new
spirit: a sense of pride in the achievements of the Malayan People’s Anti-
Japanese Army (MPAJA), and determination to take a part in shaping the
future of the country.” He then adds, “The thoughts and ambitions of many
Chinese were suddenly switched from their old homeland and re-focused on
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Malaya, where they intended to go on living.”4 Using the word “sudden” to
describe this postwar switch in thoughts and ambitions is not appropriate or
accurate.
The Malayan Union Scheme proposed by Great Britain in October 1945
was discarded due to opposition from Malay conservatives, and in its place
the Federation of Malaya was formed in February 1948, under which sweep-
ing restrictions were imposed on residents of non-Malay origin for gaining
citizenship. The Chinese showed little enthusiasm about getting involved in
the Malayan Union issue, even though citizenship became the focal point of
disputes. Victor Purcell, a pioneer in the study of the Malayan Chinese com-
munity wrote, “Altogether there was apathy among the Chinese to the Ma-
layan Union. . . . The Chinese press still showed very little interest, though
their columns were filled with China news.”5
Many other researchers concurred with Purcell.6 From a similar point of
view, Khoo Kay Kim commented that the relaxation of conditions for grant-
ing citizenship by amending the constitutional law in 1952 had aimed at shifting
interest among Malayan Chinese from events in China to Malayan affairs.7
The editorial of the June 16, 1947 issue of the Nan Chiau Jit Pao argued that
Malaya was still not an independent state at that time, and it was still unclear
what rights would actually be bestowed on a “citizen,” thus it was only natu-
ral that the Chinese would prefer to retain their Chinese nationality.8 While
there were also such opinions as “their disinterest in Malaya stemmed from a
deep interest in China,”9 and “feelings of loyalty towards China continued,”10
another writer stated, “the non-Malays were probably more pre-occupied with
the problem of personal rehabilitation, . . .”11
The MCP had been an organization made up mainly of Chinese since its
founding in 1930. It directed the anti-Japanese movement during the Japa-
nese occupation of Malaya, and in the early postwar years until its call for an
armed struggle in June 1948 to overthrow the colonial government, it had
held legal status and had become the main organization for political activity
in the Chinese community. Thus it was quite natural that the MCP would
become an important topic of research when studying the pre- and immediate
postwar periods.
Cheah Boon Kheng, the leading expert on the MCP, made the following
comment about the party’s view of China.
“The leading part played by the MCP/MPAJU [Malayan People’s Anti-
Japanese Union]/MPAJA [Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army] in these
celebrations [the Double Tenth of 1945] attested to the fact that they were
seen by Chinese and by themselves as Chinese organizations and Chinese
patriots owing a loyalty to China.”12 On the other hand he stated elsewhere
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that “it was only from 1937 to 1941, because of the anti-Japanese movement,
that the MCP drifted with the current of Chinese nationalism.”13
Cheah saw an MCP with China leanings only during the period 1937–41,
and he was of opinion that in the postwar period only in 1945 could the party
be seen as Chinese patriots.
Regardless of the character of the MCP itself, there is the view that the
party’s emphasis on China was merely a tool to expand its organization;14 but
this view does not clarify how the party evaluated its relations with China.
Charles Gamba, a scholar on the postwar Malayan labor movement, views
the China-inclination of the communist sympathizer in Malaya as more stead-
fast and long lasting: “Chinese ‘patriotism’ and Communism, in so far as the
Chinese Communist sympathizer was concerned, seemed to blend and often
to be interchangeable.”15
Leong Yee Fong has recently provided the following interesting insight
concerning the labor movement under the direction of the MCP.
The General Labour Unions [GLU; MCP-influenced national trade union, renamed
to the Federation of Trade Unions in 1947], while emphasizing on Indian labour
mobilization, did not make any positive efforts to win over Chinese labour. . . . On
the contrary, the GLUs instead of concentrating on the Chinese labour problems. . . .
were more concerned with political issues in China that had little relevance to
labour struggling amidst the confusion of post-war economic shortages and low
wages.16
Unfortunately Leong does not go any further into the MCP’s China connec-
tion, thus leaving us without any idea of how the MCP, GLU, and FTU got
involved in Chinese politics and what kinds of specific activities they carried
on.
In the above literature we do find reference to China-oriented tendencies
among the Malayan Chinese in general and the MCP in particular, but we are
given no analysis of the phenomenon. As a result, these studies fail to deal
with the kinds of China-related activities that were carried on, how wide-
spread these activities were, and how they evolved; moreover, we have no
clue as to either why, or in what manner the Malayan Chinese community’s
orientation toward China changed. The present volume will attempt to fill
this gap in the analysis.
II.
The bond between the Malayan Chinese and China proper was made up of
three elements: the strength of China-oriented identity among the Malayan
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Chinese, the existence of Malayan Chinese organizations and activities that
pursued involvement in China’s internal politics, and the Chinese government’s
involvement in Malayan Chinese affairs.
What will be referred to as “China” here is the Republic of China until
September 1949 and the People’s Republic of China that was established in
October of that year. Both Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Kuomintang
(KMT) factions existed since their split in the 1920s, and openly vied with
each other to obtain the support of overseas Chinese all over the world. The
KMT factions not only established branches of the Kuomintang, but also were
able to bring under their influence Chinese Chambers of Commerce in each
country of the world. However, their supporters constituted only a small num-
ber of elite Chinese, including the business community, and rarely appealed
to the overseas Chinese masses. In contrast, the CCP factions were able to
garner support from among educators, students, workers, farmers, small-scale
merchants, shop assistants, petty traders, and hawkers, and thus enjoyed greater
influence than the KMT factions in local politics and society. Furthermore,
after moving to Taiwan, the KMT government lost its largest base of support
from overseas Chinese when its administrative control of the home provinces
of Fujian and Guangdong ended. In effect, leftist and CCP organizations,
until their suppression and dissolution, embodied general overseas Chinese
perceptions and became community spokespersons. This is why leftist/CCP
organizations and their development need to be at the center of any analysis
concerning Chinese sympathies and China-oriented identity consciousness.
However, when we analyze overseas Chinese of the postwar era till the late
1950s, studying only leftist/CCP organizations will not suffice to explain the
sense of belonging or identity of overseas Chinese on the whole. When deal-
ing with Malaya, there are three reasons for having to broaden one’s analyti-
cal focus.
To begin with, leftist/CCP organizations in postwar Malaya were suppressed,
and many of them declared illegal or at least rendered ineffective. These or-
ganizations’ cessation of operations, their going underground, or disappear-
ance cannot necessarily be equated with a mental transformation in their sup-
porters  resulting  in  disinterest  toward  China  and  an  orientation  toward
Malayan affairs, because there is a fairly long time gap that exists between
organizational disappearance and mental transformation.
We are also faced with a serious paucity of information related to the ac-
tivities and opinions of these leftist/CCP groups after they were outlawed,
making it very difficult to ascertain what exactly happened to cause changes
in the perceptions of the majority of Chinese who had formerly participated
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in and supported these groups and later chose to remain in Malaya. Publica-
tions by central organizations, such as the Min Sheng Pao of the MCP and
Nan Chiau Jit Pao of the CDL Malayan branch, are excellent sources of in-
formation about perceptions and activities, but after they were banned in June
1948 and September 1950 respectively, one only rarely heard about the MCP
which continued illegal activities. The leftist/CCP groups that were not out-
lawed at the time (several mass and united front organizations apparently
continued to exist) lost their organs and thus the ability to impart information
on their own behalf. This loss of leftist/CCP sources has made it necessary for
researchers to seek out other means for measuring changes in China-oriented
identity consciousness and orientation toward China.
A preliminary attempt to trace how long these leftist/CCP organizations
were able to continue operations has produced only a very small amount of
data, and even if we could obtain information on how long they continued, it
would be impossible to discover from this such important facts as organiza-
tion size, character, membership, and perceptions. Therefore, any analysis of
those organizations which were left untouched by official suppression and
allowed to exist would turn out to be very limited in scope.
However, there are records of those who left the CCP factions and con-
comitantly began to express an increasing interest in Malayan affairs. This
information has allowed us to trace these people and will be the source for the
analysis presented in this volume.
The second reason why we must focus also on non-leftist/CCP groups has
to do with non-political groups, like mutual assistance and friendship asso-
ciations, which did support the leftist/CCP organizations, but were not dis-
banded after the latter were outlawed. One example of such an association is
the Singapore Hokkien Huay Kuan (the Fujian Association). After the leftists
were outlawed, these associations continued their CCP sympathies for a time,
but given the anti-CCP and repressive policies implemented in Malaya, they
quickly distanced themselves from the CCP and became increasingly inter-
ested in local affairs. It is therefore necessary to examine the relationship
between these mutual aid/friendship associations and political organizations
having CCP sympathies, as well as how they lost interest in China.
The third reason is the existence of a China-oriented identity that went
beyond the rivalry between the CCP and KMT factions. It is an emotional
attachment to China that ran deeply within overseas Chinese regardless of
their political leanings. This identity is probably best characterized by how
Malayan Chinese came to understand the Chinese consulates in Malaya, be-
lieving that they should protect them whenever their civil rights were infringed
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upon. In fact, the Chinese would request direct protection from the consulates
or at least that they come to terms with the local colonial authorities on their
behalf.
One more important indicator that should be taken into account concern-
ing the perceptions of overseas Chinese in general is the editorial positions
taken by the Chinese-language newspapers they read. While the CCP Chi-
nese newspapers were banned from publication, during the early 1950s fol-
lowing the establishment of the People’s Republic, many of the Kuomintang
and neutral newspapers gradually became pro-CCP in their views, thus simi-
larly influencing their readerships, and then gradually switched their atten-
tion and sympathies to local Malayan affairs.
After Malayan governments (Federation of Malaya and Singapore) banned
the celebration of National Day on October 1 commemorating the establish-
ment of the People’s Republic of China, the celebration of the Double Tenth
(on October 10) commemorating the founding of the Kuomintang govern-
ment began to take on an emotional sense of belonging to China over and
above party lines. Those who were no longer able to celebrate October 1 took
part in celebrating the Double Tenth at the grass-roots level and separated
themselves from the elite who openly supported the Chiang Kai-shek regime.
However, these Double Tenth celebrations were gradually scaled down and
eventually disappeared altogether due to the growth of a deeper Malaya-ori-
ented consciousness, restrictions imposed by the Malayan authorities, and
the growing isolation of the die-hard Kuomintang supporters from the over-
seas Chinese masses.
Therefore, discovering how Malayan Chinese placed the Chinese consu-
lates in their lives, how the position of Chinese-language newspapers changed
regarding China and Malaya, and how the celebration of the Double Tenth
evolved is probably the most effective way available for viewing the changes
in China-oriented identity consciousness among Malayan Chinese after the
break up of the leftist/CCP organizations.
Finally, the term “China-oriented identity consciousness” will be used in
this book to indicate how overseas Chinese looked upon the Chinese main-
land as their homeland and how they felt in one way or another obligated to
participate in Chinese internal politics. We should emphasis that whether or
not one wanted to return home to China or actually did is not the point here.
On the other hand, “Malaya-oriented identity consciousness” is the term that
will be used to describe Malayan Chinese who believed their home country
was Malaya, consciously sought to participate in local politics, and desired to
obtain the legal rights granted to the citizens of Malaya. The most important
question that will be taken up in the following pages is by what process China-
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oriented identity consciousness was transformed into Malaya-oriented iden-
tity consciousness within the local Malayan Chinese community.
III.
This book is structured as follows.
In Chapter 1, I will try to discover how important the involvement of Ma-
layan Chinese in China’s internal politics was. Such involvement will be
gauged from the scope and diversity of organizations that participated in vari-
ous public gatherings and assemblies, sponsored mainly by the Malayan Com-
munist Party, which in the research to date has been discussed only in relation
to its involvement in Malayan local politics. I will then trace when, how and
why these gatherings died out, in other words, the process by which Malayan
Chinese became oriented toward Malayan local politics. I will follow the
way in which the celebration of China’s national day, the Double Tenth, which
formed the broadest base of China-oriented identity consciousness, completely
disappeared by 1958, after not only leftist and Malayan Communist Party
organizations and activities but also Kuomintang movements were restricted
and banned in Malaya.
Chapter 2 investigates when and how Chinese-language newspapers, which
often referred to China as “the homeland” and “our country,” began to use
these same terms in reference to Malaya. This change of editorial perception
that took place in these newspapers is symbolized by publication holidays
related to Chinese events becoming holidays for no specific reason and fi-
nally disappearing during the 1950s.
In Chapter 3, the topic of the Chinese consulates in Malaya is dealt with in
relation to how they were unable to meet the expectations of Malayan Chi-
nese concerning the protection of their civil rights. Such powerlessness on
the part of the Chinese consular corps to help the Malayan Chinese politically
and socioeconomically became one important factor in the growing disinter-
est toward China’s internal affairs. In place of the Chinese consulate, the
Malayan Chinese Association took on the central role in the struggle for civil
rights protection. This further accelerated the turning of Malayan Chinese
away from China and toward greater identification with Malayan affairs.
In Chapter 4, I will take up the question of how important and influential
the Chinese government’s overseas Chinese policy was at the local level in
Malaya and the circumstances under which such importance and influence
soon waned. In order to answer this question, I will first describe the process
for selecting representatives to the Republic of China’s National Assembly of
1948, a process that was repeated for the selection of representatives to the
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People’s Republic of China National People’s Congress in 1954. Then I will
look at China’s involvement in overseas Chinese education, and the selection
of athletes for the 1948 Olympic Games in London.
The examination and discussion of all the above issues seeks to explain the
extent that postwar Malayan Chinese identified themselves with China, and
the way this identity consciousness was reoriented toward Malaya.
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